Idealism is a prominent
tradition in the history of philosophy, both Western and Eastern. It can
be defined by acceptance of the premise that the universe is first and
foremost a manifestation of mind or reason, rather than of dead,
mindless matter. Instead of seeing mind/reason as relatively late
products of unintelligent, mechanical processes in physical nature, as
Materialism holds, Idealism by and large turns this developmental
sequence around and sees mind/reason as the 'motor' behind physical
processes towards increasing complexity.
A SHORT OVERVIEW OF THE IDEALIST TRADITION
Idealism has ancient roots in both Western and Eastern philosophy. In
Eastern philosophy, Idealist themes can be found in the Indian
philosophies of the Vedanta and Yogacara Buddhism. Vedanta is the more
ancient of these: it conceives of the ultimate ground of reality or
"Brahman" as pure "self-luminous" consciousness. Continuing Vedantic
themes in a Buddhist setting, Yogacara Buddhism claims that only "pure
mind" is ultimately real. In Eastern philosophy, however, Idealism often
goes hand in hand with mystical acosmism, where the full reality of the
empirical world is denied in contrast to the mystical state of pure,
contentless consciousness reached in meditation. This happens
paradigmatically in the non-dual Vedanta of the 8th century Indian
philosopher Shankara.
For a more positive evaluation of the
empirical world from an Idealist perspective we must turn to Idealism in
the Western tradition. This is not to say, however, that Eastern
Idealism has no value. Moreover, some Idealists of the Western tradition
(Parmenides, Schelling, Bradley) have come awfully close to the
mystical acosmism of their Eastern counterparts.
In Western
philosophy the tradition of Idealism arguably started with the
Presocratic philosophers Anaxagoras ("it is intelligence that arranges
and causes all things") and Parmenides ("thinking and being are the
same"). They passed the torch to Plato, who famously saw the empirical
world as an image or expression of eternal Ideas. Plato in turn
bequeathed the Idealist vision of the universe to Plotinus, who added to
Platonism the Aristotelian conception of God as "thought thinking
itself", thereby arriving at a picture of the universe as the
"emanation" of the One's self-contemplation. In this way Plotinus
effectively anticipated the Absolute Idealism of the post-Kantian German
Idealists Schelling and Hegel.
But before the latter could
arrive on the scene, modern philosophy first had to take the
epistemological turn, notably through Descartes' focus on individual
self-consciousness as the paradigm of certain knowledge. From Descartes
onwards, Idealism took on a subjective flavor, centering on the
epistemological argument that our knowledge of reality is confined to
our own thoughts and perceptions (Berkeley, Kant).
The
post-Kantian German Idealists, although starting from this
epistemologically inspired Idealism, arguably returned to Idealism's
more ontological beginnings in Greek philosophy, combining the Cartesian
focus on the cogito as the paradigm of certain knowledge ("Absolute
Knowledge") with the more Neoplatonist focus on "thought thinking
itself" as the teleological origin of the empirical universe.
In
the second half of the 19th century, the legacy of German Absolute
Idealism was taken up and further developed by the British Idealists
(Green, Bradley, McTaggart, Bosanquet, Collingwood, Whitehead e.a.) and
the American Idealists, most notably Royce. On the European Continent
the tradition of Idealism was continued by Husserl.These philosophers
took Idealism into the 20th century, enriching it with themes from
contemporary logic, mathematics, and natural science. In the beginning
of the 20th century, however, British and American Idealism were all but
effaced by the emergence of logical empiricism and analytic philosophy.
The original proponents of the latter, notably Moore and Russell,
asserted their own position through vigorous opposition to and ridicule
of their Idealist predecessors, resulting in a distorted caricature of
what Idealism really amounts to.
In present times, however, this
caricature is in the process of being corrected, and Idealism is
experiencing a revival owing to new developments in philosophy and
science. Four must be singled out for special attention:
(1) The
so-termed "hard problem of consciousness" and the influence of
Russellian monism: Conscious states or "qualia" appear to be irreducible
to physics and even to be the sole candidates for being the intrinsic
entities on which physical structure rests, thereby suggesting a
panpsychist ontology (e.g. Galen Strawson).
(2) The emergence of
Normative Idealism in opposition to physicalist Eliminativism: Philosophers like McDowell and Brandom have
made a remarkable return to Kant and Hegel by pointing out that
conceptuality and rationality in general are intrinsically normative,
having to do with how people ought to think rather than with how they
factually think. Thus, given the conceptually laden impact of empirical
experience on thought, the empirical world must have a normative
significance that cannot be accounted for in strictly naturalistic or
scientistic terms. According to philosophers like McDowell and Brandom,
the empirical world turns out to have a normative-conceptual structure
that is best approached by returning to the Idealisms expounded by Kant
and Hegel.
(3) The focus on "observer participancy" in
contemporary physics: The role of conscious observation in quantum
mechanics and the apparent fine-tuning of the universe for the evolution
of intelligent life (i.e. the anthropic principle) have, together with
the hard problem of consciousness, suggested to some physicists (e.g.
Von Neumann, Wigner, Wheeler) that consciousness plays a more
fundamental role in the universe than physical science has traditionally
assumed. In this way physics could lead to a scientific reanimation of
Idealism.
(4) The rediscovery of (Neo-)Platonic Idealism in
relation to Leibniz's question: There is at present a remarkable revival
of interesting in Leibniz's famous question, "Why is there something
rather than nothing?". Various philosophers and physicists have rebegun
to develop possible solutions to this most fundamental problem. In this
context the ontological importance of (Neo-)Platonic Idealism has been
rediscovered by philosphers like Leslie and Rescher. Agreeing with other
philosophers, such as Nozick, that the ultimate cause or ground of
existence must also be self-causing or self-grounding (in order to avoid
a regress), Leslie and Rescher argue that the self-explaining principle
underlying existence is best conceived in terms of value, analogous to
Plato's and Plotinus' focus on the "Good beyond Being". Value, as Leslie
and Rescher point out, explains existence, because it is good that
there is existence, and at the same time value explains itself as well,
because it is good that there is goodness. In this way the
(Neo-)Platonic focus on the Good as the self-grounding of ground of
existence has made a remarkable return in contemporary philosophy. What
is lacking, however, in both Leslie and Rescher is a proper
acknowledgement of the role played by absolute self-awareness in this
ontological self-grounding. In this regard they lag behind Plotinus who
not only conceived of the One as the "Good beyond Being" but also as
absolute self-awareness, such that "its being is its act of looking at
itself" as Plotinus writes. Since, as remarked, Plotinus in this regard
anticipated the Absolute Idealism of Schelling and Hegel, the
introduction of the latter into the current debate about Leibniz's
question remains one of the desiderata of future research in Idealism.
VARIETIES OF IDEALISM
As the above history of Idealism makes clear, albeit in a very
truncated fashion, Idealism is by no means a single school or system of
thought. Besides the dispute between Idealism and Materialism or
Physicalism, there is also the internal dispute between rival schools of
Idealism. Something of this disagreement already appeared above when it
was said that "Idealism can be defined by acceptance of the premise
that the universe is first and foremost a manifestation of mind or
reason". The disjunction -- mind or reason -- signals a disagreement
among Idealists concerning the nature of that ultimate ground underlying
the empirical world. Is that ground a mind in a subjective sense, as in
(self-)consciousness or selfhood? Or should we rather banish
subjectivity from the Idealist explanation of the world, focusing rather
on an impersonal and objective reason ("logos") as the ultimate ground
or reality? Given this disjunction, Idealist philosophy forms a gradient
spectrum between the extremes of subjectivism and objectivism. Roughly
the following positions can be distinguished:
(1) Objective
Idealism: Empirical reality is the manifestation of objective,
non-personal and non-spatiotemporal ideal entities, such as Plato's
Ideas, or mathematical structures as in Mathematical Platonism. The
latter is currently advocated by physicists like Penrose and Tegmark.
Normative Idealism (McDowell, Brandom), with its focus on the
constitutive importance of publicly valid conceptual norms, also seems
to be a species of Objective Idealism.
(2) Subjective Idealism:
Empirical reality exists only for a conscious subject who constructs it
on the basis of its experiences and a priori cognitive structures. We
can know nothing about reality as it exists apart from the knowing
subject. In its phenomenalist version, this position was advocated by
Berkeley. In a more rationalist vein the position was advocated by Kant
and Fichte.
(3) Absolute Idealism: There is nothing apart from
the absolute Self or Spirit that unfolds itself in the empirical world.
In a sense Absolute Idealism combines Objective and Subjective Idealism
in that it conceives of the ultimate ground of reality as an ideal Self
or Spirit whose self-realization involves the Ideas highlighted in
Platonism. This position has been famously advocated by Schelling and
Hegel, though in important ways they were already anticipated by
Plotinus and later Neoplatonists (e.g. Proclus, Eriugena).
(4)
Panpsychist Idealism: This is the view that consciousness, mind or soul
is a universal feature of all things. It doesn't necessarily say that
all physical objects are manifestations of mind but it does say that all
physical objects have mind or at least an aspect of mentality.
Panpsychism may go hand in hand with metaphysical pluralism, stating
that the universe is a collection of countless many minds. Famous
Panpsychists are Thales, Spinoza, Leibniz, James, and most recently
Galen Strawson. Panpsychism is in itself a very diverse doctrine, and
its relation to the other forms of Idealism has up till now not been
properly dealt with. This is one of the desiderata of future research.
I propose a new version of idealism : mind/mathematics dualism (See details in my text).
ReplyDeleteI also organized the diversity of ontological views in a big table.
All 4 versions of idealism you listed are included there under different names:
Objective idealism = mathematical monism
Subjective Idealism = Agnostic scientism
Absolute Idealism = Religion/Idealism